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Abstract Multiple failures can have catastrophic consequences on the normal
operation of telecommunication networks. In this sense, guaranteeing network
robustness to avoid users and services being disconnected is essential. A wide range
of metrics have been proposed for measuring network robustness. In this paper the
taxonomy of robustness metrics in telecommunication networks has been extended
and a classification of multiple failures scenarios has been made. Moreover, a
structural and centrality robustness comparison of 15 real telecommunication net-
works experiencing multiple failures was carried out. Through this analysis the
topological properties which are common for grouping networks with similar
robustness are able to be identified.
Keywords Robustness analysis  Robustness metrics  Multiple failures  Targeted
attacks  Random failures  Telecommunications networks
1 Introduction
Telecommunication networks are crucial infrastructures required to support a
variety of human activities such as socialization, entertainment, information
gathering, health and well-being, learning, transportation and emergency commu-
nications. The consequences of multiple failures in telecommunication networks are
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dramatic as when they occur millions of users and services can be disconnected. In
this work, and to enhance robustness, the vulnerability of networks under multiple
failure scenarios has been addressed. Robustness can be defined as the ability of a
network to continue performing well when it is subject to failures. Failures can be
caused by fiber cuts, configuration errors, viruses and worms, cyber-attacks,
terrorism or natural disasters [1].
Some research into the robustness analysis of telecommunication networks and
data centers networks (DCN) has been carried out and different metrics to measure
the network robustness have been proposed. In [2] some classical and contemporary
robustness metrics are studied for a set of real telecommunication networks, and the
most robust networks are identified by comparing the metrics obtained from
simulations of failure scenarios. In [3] the robustness of real networks and generic
topologies (random, scale-free and exponent) in non-failure scenarios are compared.
Both, [2, 3] rank the better topologies based on their robustness metrics. In [4] an
analytical comparison of well-known robustness metrics in some model and
empirical networks, when random and targeted attacks occur, is performed. In [4] it
is shown that the node degree centrality metric can be used as an effective strategy
to remove nodes in simultaneous targeted attacks, whereas for sequential attacks it
is betweenness centrality. The temporal evolution of the topological robustness of
backbone telecommunication networks by identifying their trends is analyzed in [1].
In [1] it is found that modifying the structure of networks over time does not
guarantee a better robustness. In [5] the robustness of random models and real
networks under different scenarios is evaluated. The random and targeted attacks
affect the network performance and although networks may have similar average-
case performance under attack, they may differ significantly in their sensitivities to
certain attack sequences [5]. In [6] the characteristics of network topologies that
maintain a high level of throughput in spite of multiple attacks are studied.
As regards to DNC topologies, in [7] a multi-layered graph modeling of various
DCNs topologies is presented and the structural robustness metrics analysis
considering various failure scenarios is carried out. Moreover, in [7] a new
procedure to quantify the DCN robustness is proposed based on the deterioration
metric which evaluates the network robustness based on the percentage change in
the graph structure. Classic connectivity measures are inadequate for evaluating
DCN connectivity as shown in [8]. Therefore, a new connectivity metric called l-
A2TR (l-average two-terminal reliability) is proposed in [8], which evaluates how
difficult it is to break a network into components in the case of node or link failures.
The benefits of different DCN topologies taking the reliability and survivability
requirements into account are analyzed in [9]. The most robust DCN topology for
both link and node failure scenarios is also identified in [9].
The aim of this work is to analyze the structural and centrality robustness of 15
real telecommunication networks under multiple failures (random and targeted).
Through this analysis the topological properties for grouping networks with similar
robustness are identified and compared with the results found in previous work. This
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 extends the taxonomy to classify robustness
metrics. Section 3 shows the type of failures that can affect telecommunication
networks. In Sect. 4, the structural properties of the networks studied in this work
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are described while the simulation results of structural and centrality robustness
metrics under multiple failure scenarios are presented and analyzed in Sect. 5.
Finally, Sect. 6 provides conclusions and future work.
2 Taxonomy of Robustness Metrics
To classify robustness metrics we consider a taxonomy based on structural properties,
centrality measures and services supported by networks. A preliminary version of this
taxonomy can be found in [2]. Table 1 shows an extended taxonomy of robustness
metrics. A description of the robustness metrics is presented in this section.
2.1 Structural Metrics
Structural metrics are a well-known area in the conventional analysis of graphs.
They are also used to explain stability—or the lack of it—in a network, and
Table 1 Taxonomy of robustness metrics
Structural robustness Centrality measures Functional robustness
Average nodal degree ðhkiÞ Degree centrality (dc) Elasticity (E)




Diameter (D) Closeness centrality (cc) Qualitative robustness metric
(QLRM)
Assortativity coefficient (r) Betweenness centrality
(bc)
Endurance (n)
Heterogeneity (rk) Cross-clique centrality R-value
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determine how viruses spread through a network under node/link removal [10].
Preliminary robustness analysis is carried out by considering the following basic
network properties: average nodal degree ðhkiÞ, average shortest path length ðhliÞ,
diameter (D) and assortative coefficient (r) [2]. In this sense, networks with higher
hki are considered better-connected on average and, consequently, are likely to be
more robust (i.e. there are more chances to establish new connections). In regards to
hli, it is calculated as an average of all the shortest paths between all the possible
origin–destination vertex pairs of the network. A network is more robust if hli is at
its lowest as it is likely to lose fewer connections. D is the longest of all the shortest
paths between pairs of nodes, thus one would want the diameter of networks to be
low. The r coefficient lies within the range [–1, 1] and it defines two types of
networks. Disassortative networks with r\ 0 have an excess of links connecting
nodes of dissimilar degrees. The opposite properties apply to assortative networks
with r[ 0 that have an excess of links connecting nodes of similar degrees [11]. As
can be found in [4], such networks exhibit greater vulnerability to certain types of
targeted attacks.
Based on hki, the heterogeneity (rk) is a coefficient of variation of the
connectivity. rk is defined as the standard deviation of the hki divided by the hki.
The lower rk value translates to higher network robustness. The Efficiency (e) as the
averaged sum of the reciprocal (multiplicative inverse) of the shortest paths is also
defined. The greater the e value, the greater its robustness is. Vertex connectivity (j)
represents the smallest number of nodes that must be removed to disconnect the
network. The same definition can be applied to edge connectivity (q) when
considering links instead of nodes. The clustering coefficient ðhCiÞ captures the
presence of triangles formed by a set of three nodes, and compares the number of
triangles to the number of connected triples.
In addition, structural metrics also use the adjacency and Laplacian matrices to
abstract and calculate the robustness of the networks. The symmetry ratio (SR) is
calculated as the quotient between the distinct eigenvalues of the network adjacency
matrix and the diameter D. Networks with low SR are considered more robust to
random failures or targeted attacks. The largest eigenvalue or spectral radius (k1) is
the largest nonzero eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a network [10]. Generally,
networks with high values of k1 have a small D and higher node distinct paths. The
k1 metric also provides information on network robustness [11] and captures the
virus propagation properties of networks defining an epidemic threshold of node
infection [12].
Algebraic connectivity (k2) is defined as the second smallest Laplacian
eigenvalue. k2 measures how difficult breaking the network into different
components is. Higher k2 values indicate better robustness [13]. Networks with
identical k2 can be compared using natural connectivity (k). The k metric
characterizes the redundancy of alternative paths by quantifying the weighted
number of closed walks of all lengths. In addition, k is expressed as the average of
the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix, where a higher value indicates a more
robust network. [14]. Effective graph resistance (EGR), can be written as a function
of nonzero Laplacian eigenvalues. The EGR metric measures the number of paths
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between two nodes and their length. The smaller the EGR value is, the more robust
the network [15].
The graph diversity (GD) is related to the number of nodes shared with the
shortest path considering all possible paths between two nodes. This metric is equal
to one when paths do not share any common point of failure (node or link). The total
graph diversity (TGD) is the average of all effective path diversity (EPD) over all
paths. Consequently, calculating this metric requires significant computational
resources. Larger TGD indicates greater robustness [16].
The weighted spectrum (WS) metric is based on the eigenvalues (ki) of the
normalized Laplacian matrix and the N-cycle of a graph. Different values of
N indicate different topology properties to be analyzed e.g. N = 3 is associated to
the clustering coefficient, meanwhile N = 4 is related to the number of disjoint
paths in a network. The network robustness is calculated as W0-W, where
W denotes the default WS of the original graph and W0 denotes the WS of the
resulting graph after link or nodal failures [17].
The percolation limit or percolation threshold (qc) returns the critical fraction of
nodes that need to be removed before the network disintegrates. The degree
diversity is taken into account to calculate the percolation limit, as can be seen in
[3]. Hence, the higher degree diversity is, the higher the percolation limit is. Then, a
higher qc indicates the fraction of vertices that can be removed without
disconnecting the network is higher, which means the network is more robust.
The number of spanning trees (NST) counts all possible spanning trees that exist for
a graph. It has been proven that the number of spanning trees can be written as a
function of the unweighted Laplacian eigenvalues [3].
The average two-terminal reliability (ATTR) delivers the probability of
connectivity between a randomly chosen node pair [18]. ATTR is one when the
network is fully connected; otherwise ATTR is the number of node pairs in every
connected component divided by the total number of node pairs in the network.
ATTR also gives the fraction of node pairs that are connected to each other [19]. At
failure scenarios, the higher the average two-terminal reliability is, the higher the
robustness is.
The last structural metric is viral conductance (VC), where the robustness is
measured with respect to virus spread [20]. This metric is measured by considering
the area under the curve that provides the fraction of infected nodes in steady-state
for a range of epidemic intensities. The lower the VC in a network, the more robust,
with respect to virus spread, it is. However, as this work is focused on random
failures and targeted attacks, the VC metric is not evaluated.
2.2 Centrality Metrics
This group of metrics attempts to identify which elements in a network are the most
important or central [4]. Consequently, they could help disseminate information in
the network faster, stopping epidemics, and protecting the network from breaking.
These metrics also define the network centralization as a measure of how central the
most central node is in relation to how central all the other nodes are [21].
Centralization, which is a key characteristic of a network, can be used to measure
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network robustness as the differences between the centrality of the most central
node and that of all others [21]. In general, the most central network is the most
robust i.e. if the network has more nodes with similar centrality values, there are
then several spots to attack when centrality metrics are used to select the elements to
be removed.
A wide number of centrality metrics has been proposed to identify the most
central nodes in networks. However, the following are the most common: degree
centrality, eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality and
spreaders. In degree and eigenvector centralities the importance of a node is given
in terms of its neighbors, whereas in closeness and betweenness centralities the
importance is related to the path lengths.
Degree centrality (dc) is the simplest measure of nodal centrality, and is
determined by the number of neighbors connected to a node [22]. The larger the
degree, the more important the node is. However, if a node with a high nodal degree
fails, potentially higher numbers of connections are also prone to being affected. In
many real networks only a small number of nodes have high degrees. Accordingly,
eigenvalue centrality (ec) is based on the notion that a node should be viewed as
important if it is linked to other important nodes [22]. The ec is proportional to the
sum of the centrality scores of its neighbors, where the centrality corresponds to the
largest eigenvector of the adjacency matrix. Thus, ec can take a large value either by
the node being connected to many other nodes or by it being connected to a small
number of important nodes.
With closeness centrality (cc) the nodal importance is measured by how close a
node is to other nodes [22]. It is based on the length of the shortest path between a
given node and all other nodes in the network. An important node is typically close
to the other node if it can reach the whole network more quickly than non-close
nodes. Betweenness centrality (bc) is when the number of shortest paths that pass
through a given node is counted [22]. A node may have a high betweenness
centrality while being connected to only a small number of other vertices (not
necessarily important/central). This is due to the fact that nodes that act as bridges
between groups of other nodes typically have high bc. Thus, nodes with high bc play
a broker role in the network and are important in communication and information
diffusion [22]. Similar to bc, the link betweenness centrality (lc) can be also
calculated as the degree to which a link makes other connections possible.
Centrality metrics also take into account measures in epidemic scenarios where
the best spreaders of an epidemic do not correspond to the most central nodes.
Instead, the most efficient spreaders are those located within the core of the network
according to a k-shell decomposition analysis [23]. This metric is not evaluated in
this work as it is focused on random and targeted attacks.
2.3 Functional Metrics
This set of metrics quantifies the variation of the performance of a network in
response to multiple failures by focusing on the Quality of Service (QoS)
parameters of the established connections. Elasticity (E), the quantitative robustness
metric (QNRM) and the qualitative robustness metric (QLRM) measure the
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robustness based on a single QoS parameter such as the throughput, the number of
blocked connections or the established connections as a function of hli, respectively,
[6, 24]. The higher these metric values are, the more robust the network is. Using
the R-value, the network robustness is given by an arbitrary topological vector and a
weight vector. The topological vector components take into consideration one or
more QoS parameters, network properties or any other structural robustness metric
e.g. hop-count, average shortest path length ðhliÞ, maximum nodal degree (kmax) or
algebraic connectivity (k2). The weight vector components reflect the importance of
the topological vector for network service. The higher the R-value, the greater the
robustness is [25].
Endurance (n) is also calculated by one or more QoS parameters (e.g. delay) or
topological metrics (e.g. size of the largest connected component). In contrast to the
R-value, n places greater importance on perturbations affecting low percentages of
elements in a network. n is normalized to the interval [0, 1], where n = 1 denotes
the non-existence of robustness, whereas n = 0 is correlated to the maximum
possible degree of robustness [26]. The last functional metric is R*-value which is
the R-value computed via a normalized eigenvector or principal component (PC).
The PC gives dimension and non-arbitrary weights to each of the robustness
metrics. Without failures the R*-value is set to one and can take values in the
interval [0, ??) when failures are considered [27]. A graphical representation of
the R*-value is called the robustness surface (X), and enables a visual assessment of
network robustness variability [27] to be made.
3 Multiple Failure Scenarios
Failures can affect the normal operation of network elements (nodes or links).
Therefore, services supported by a network and users connected to it may
experience catastrophic consequences. Figure 1 shows how multiple failures can be
classified. According to temporal dimension, failure types can be either static or
dynamic. Static multiple failures are essentially one-off failures that affect one or
more elements at any given moment. Dynamic failures have a temporal dimension
and they can be determined as being epidemic or cascading failures [2].
Other failure scenarios are induced with the strategy used to remove nodes or
links. Thus, when an object that causes an attack knows and uses precise
information from the network’s topological structure, it is called an attack with

















Fig. 1 Taxonomy of multiple
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information, it is considered a black-information attack (random). The former
would be more related to intentional failures, while the latter would be with
unintentional failures [2].
In random failures, nodal or link failures occurs randomly e.g. a fiber cut by a
natural disaster. While in targeted failures, network elements are attacked
(removed) with the purpose of maximizing the impact of the attack over the
network e.g. in backbone telecommunication networks the most vulnerable routers
can be identified by the number of shortest paths passing through a given router or
by the number of physical links from one router to others [4]. Moreover, other ‘‘real
world’’ features, such as the number of potentially affected users and socio-political
and economic considerations are also used to rank the nodes to be removed in
telecommunication networks [2].
In targeted failures there are two distinct schemes for selecting the elements to be
removed. In a simultaneous targeted attack, the centrality metric is calculated for all
elements (node or link) in the network and then a specified fraction of the elements
is removed in order of the centrality measure, from highest to lowest [4]. In a
sequential targeted attack the centrality measure is calculated for all the elements in
the initial network, and the element with the highest centrality value is then
removed. Next, the centrality measures of all the elements in the resulting network
are recalculated and once again the highest ranked element is removed. This process
of recalculating the centrality measures and removing the highest ranked element is
continued until the desired fraction of elements has been removed [4].
4 Network Topologies
In this section the topological properties of the 15 real telecommunication networks
are described. This set of networks was selected through a careful search in
specialized databases considering the number of times that they were used in
relevant publications e.g. a preliminary robustness analysis of this set of topologies
can be found in [1–3]. The topologies are part of important telecommunication
networks repositories such as [28, 29]. Thus, the 15 real telecommunication
networks serve as a standardized benchmark for testing, evaluating, and comparing
several network robustness metrics.
Some of these networks are backbone transport networks (representing real
physical links), whereas others are logical networks (representing the IP layer).
Then, the selected networks offer a wide range of topological properties which
allow structural and centrality robustness analysis to be carried out. By comparing
their network robustness, the common topological properties that can be used to
group networks with similar robustness under random failures and target attacks are
identified.
Each network topology is modeled by a graph G (V, E), which is given by a
vertex set V ¼ v1; v2; . . .; vnf g and an edge set E ¼ e1; e2; . . .; emf g. Vertex (i.e.
nodes) can be routers, switches, hosts, or any telecommunication equipment, and
edges (i.e. links) can be optical fiber cables, wired or wireless links (physical or
virtual). The graph representation and topological map of this set of networks can be
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found in [28, 29]. Table 2 presents the main topological properties of the 15 real
telecommunication networks: number of nodes (n), number of links (m), average
nodal degree ðhkiÞ ± standard deviation (StDev), maximum nodal degree (kmax),
average shortest path length ðhliÞ, diameter (D) and assortativity coefficient (r). The
networks have different sizes ranging from 11 to 754 nodes and from 14 to 899
links. ABILENE is the smallest network with 11 nodes and 14 links, whereas the
KDL network is the largest with 754 nodes and 899 links.
As can be seen in Table 2, the TISCALI_L3 and DELTACOM networks have
higher hki with 5.0588 and 3.2389, respectively. In contrast, SPRINT_L1 and KDL
have the lowest hki values, 2.3712 and 2.3846, respectively. According to kmax,
TISCALI_L3 has the node with the highest number of connections (22), whereas
ABILENE has the node with the lowest degree (3). In telecommunication networks,
kmax is used to identify the most important node according to the number of links.
Therefore, if the node with high nodal degree fails, a potentially higher number of
connections are also prone to being affected.
In terms of hli and D, ABILENE and TISCALI_L3 have the lowest values for
these properties. The former has hli ¼ 2:4182; while the latter has hli ¼ 2:4298.
Both networks have D = 5. Nonetheless, KDL and SPRINT_L1 with 22.727 and
14.705 have the higher values of hli, and KDL and US_MW have the higher D
values, 58 and 42, respectively. Finally, Table 2 shows that most of the networks
analyzed have a negative or near to zero value of r. DELTACOM (0.3158) is the
most assortative network and CESNET (-0.3739) is the most disassortative. As
explain above, when r\ 0 the network is said to be disassortative, meaning that it
has an excess of links connecting nodes of dissimilar degrees, whereas assortative
Table 2 Topological properties of the 15 real networks
Network n m hki ± StDev kmax hli D r
ABILENE 11 14 2.55 ± 0.52 3 2.42 5 0.067
GEANT 40 61 3.05 ± 1.95 10 3.53 8 -0.204
RENATER 43 56 2.60 ± 1.70 10 3.93 9 -0.1544
GpENI_L2 51 61 2.39 ± 1.73 9 4.69 10 -0.232
TISCALI_L3 51 129 5.06 ± 5.42 22 2.43 5 -0.361
CESNET 52 63 2.42 ± 3.13 19 3.05 6 -0.374
GARR 61 89 2.92 ± 3.09 14 3.62 8 -0.258
CORONET_L1 100 136 2.72 ± 0.83 5 6.67 15 0.035
DELTACOM 113 183 3.24 ± 1.85 10 7.16 23 0.316
USCARRIER 158 189 2.39 ± 0.82 6 12.09 35 -0.095
COGENTCO 197 245 2.48 ± 1.06 9 10.51 28 0.02
SPRINT_L1 264 313 2.37 ± 0.81 6 14.70 37 -0.188
ATT_L1 383 488 2.55 ± 1.15 8 14.13 39 -0.062
US_MW 411 553 2.69 ± 1.13 7 13.65 42 0.112
KDL 754 899 2.38 ± 0.85 7 22.73 58 -0.096
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networks are when r[ 0 indicating an excess of links connecting nodes of similar
degrees.
5 Results and Discussion
In this section, initially, the measurement of structural and centrality robustness
metrics in a static scenario are presented and a preliminary robustness comparison is
carried out. Then, some simulation scenarios are set up to allow the robustness
under random and targeted attacks to be evaluated and analyzed. Most metrics
presented in Fig. 2 were simulated under multiple failure scenarios. However, in
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Fig. 2 Structural results for simultaneous targeted attack. a Average two-terminal reliability (ATTR)
results and b natural connectivity (k) results
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the robustness behavior of the set of the 15 real networks to be abstracted for
grouping according to common topological properties.
Multiple failure scenarios were simulated for random and targeted attacks and in
each one a subset of the structural and centrality robustness metrics is analyzed. The
nodes to be removed in the simultaneous targeted attacks were selected by their
degree centrality, whereas for the sequential targeted attacks they were selected by
their betweenness centrality. In all scenarios, the percentage of nodes removed
(P) ranged from 1 to 70 %. Twenty and ten runs were performed for random and
targeted attacks, respectively. For each of the runs, different subsets of nodes were
selected according to the failure scenario.
5.1 Robustness Comparison in a Static Scenario
Table 3 shows the measures of the structural and centrality robustness metrics for
the defined set of real networks in a static scenario. The first and second columns in
Table 3 show that ABILENE and CORONET_L1 have maximum vertex connec-
tivity (j) and edge connectivity (q), (two in each case), i.e. more than one element
must be removed to break these networks. The clustering coefficient ðhCiÞ shows
that the TISCALI_L3 (0.3776) and GPENI_L2 (0.1847) networks are the most
robust. Their nodes are more interconnected with their neighbors as there are many
triangles (i.e. many alternative paths) in case of nodal or link failures. However, for
the CORONET_L1 network, hCi ¼ 0 as it does not have any triangles, as can be
seen in its topological map available in [29]. As regards to the symmetry ratio (SR),
the lowest value indicates high robustness. Thus, ABILENE and USCARRIER, with
SR values equal to 2.2 and 4.5143, respectively, are the most robust networks.
Thereby, SR suggests that the impact caused by removing a node does not depend
on which node is removed [2].
With the largest eigenvalue (k1), TISCALI_L3 and DELTACOM are the more
robust networks, with values of 9.5895 and 6.0015, respectively. On the other hand,
TISCALI_L3 and ABILENE have the highest values of the second smallest
Laplacian, each one with 0.5255 and 0.3238. Therefore, according to the algebraic
connectivity (k2), they are the most robust networks. Also, for the TISCALI_L3 and
ABILENE networks a similar robustness result can be concluded from their low
values of D and hli. Nonetheless, DELTACOM is one the most robust networks
according to k1, with a low k2 value (0.0233) and high values of hli (3.2389) and
D (10), the robustness results are opposite. In this case, a relevant conclusion about
its robustness cannot be drawn as the k1 and k2 metrics rank DELTACOM network
in a different way.
Based on natural connectivity (k), TISCALI_L3 and GARR are the most robust
networks having the highest values at 5.6718 and 2.3343, respectively. With the
effective graph resistance (EGR), the better robustness is for ABILENE and
GEANT as they obtain the smallest values of EGR: 7.54E?01 and 1.31E?03,
respectively, however, KDL and US_MW obtain the worst EGR (with values of
1.98E?06 and 3.48E?05, respectively). Weighted spectrum (WS) was calculated
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with N = 3 and the most robust networks are GARR and ABILENE with values of
0.1990 and 0.3333, respectively.
In the case of percolation limit (qc), TISCALI_L3 (0.8974) and CESNET
(0.8142) have the highest values which indicate these networks are more robust.
With respect to number of spanning trees (NST), in general, the larger the network,
the higher the NST is. Therefore, NST must be compared in networks of similar
sizes. By comparing the NST of the whole set of networks, KDL and US_MW result
in being the most robust networks. However, by comparing the NST of networks of
a similar size, TISCALI_L3 is more robust than RENATER and CESNET because,
as shown in Table 2, the first has more links than other. Therefore, the number of
spanning trees in the TISCALI_L3 networks is higher. In the static scenario, the
average two-terminal reliability (ATTR) for all networks is one.
As regards to centrality-based metrics, we consider nodal degree centrality (dc),
nodal closeness centrality (cc), nodal betweenness centrality (bc) and link
betweenness centrality (bc) to measure the network centralization. As explained
above, in Sect. 2.2, the network centralization is used to analyze the network
robustness based on these centrality metrics as the differences between the centrality
of the most central node and that of all others [21]. This indicates that those
networks close to uniform centrality distributions are more robust in the case of
targeted attacks to the most central nodes. In Table 3 it can be seen that networks
with the highest centralization values when considering dc are TISCALI_L3
(0.3388) and CESNET (0.325); with ec, the KDL (0.986) and ATT_L1 (0.9756)
networks are the most centrals; based on cc, CESNET (0.4605) and TISCALI_L3
(0.3837) networks have the highest centralization values; the most central networks
based on bc are CESNET (0.6939) and GARR (0.4591), and lastly USCARRIER
(0.27) and CESNET (0.24) have the highest network centralization based on lc.
This preliminary robustness analysis (summarized in Table 3) shows that some
metrics differ when identifying the most robust networks. Hence, taking just one
metric is not sufficient to measure the network robustness. Therefore, a set of
significant metrics to calculate the robustness and compare their results should be
considered. In order to identify the relationships between network properties and
their robustness it is necessary to consider the behavior of this set of real
telecommunication networks when multiple failures occur under targeted attacks
and random failures.
5.2 Robustness Analysis Under Simultaneous Targeted Attacks
In this section, robustness analysis of the real telecommunication networks when
nodes are removed under the simultaneous targeted attack is presented. According
to [4], the nodal degree centrality (dc), which is a purely local centrality measure, is
the most effective technique for removing nodes in the case of simultaneous
targeted attacks. In Fig. 2a the robustness results using the average two-terminal
reliability (ATTR) metric are shown. When the network is fully connected, exactly
one component exists and ATTR is one. Successive removal of nodes or links will
bring it closer to zero [18]. If failures affect two topologies in the same percentage
of nodes or links, the one that takes longer to reach a given critical ATTR can be
J Netw Syst Manage (2017) 25:269–289 281
123
considered the more robust [18]. ATTR provides an approximation to measure the
network connections and to group networks with similar robustness. Then, for each
subset of networks the common topological properties among them can be
identified.
As can be observed in Fig. 2a, it is possible to identify different affectation levels
i.e. the number of lost connections when a percentage of nodes are eliminated from
the networks. The weak level is between 1 and 5 % of failures, where network
connections can decrease dramatically to 60 %. When the percentage of nodes
removed (P) is in the range of 5–20 %, networks have an intermediate affectation
with a reduction of 70 % of connections. At 20 % or more of P, networks reduce
their connection to\10 %, so networks are near to being completely disconnected
with a severe affectation. Therefore, making robustness comparisons for P[ 20 %
is not relevant as these networks are close to being completely disconnected and
robustness metrics do not reflect real behavior.
For each P, the number of nodes removed from the ABILENE network does not
vary substantially due to its small number of nodes and links. Consequently,
ABILENE was not considered in the present analysis. The robustness analysis using
the ATTR metric (see Fig. 2a) shows that CORONET_L1 is the most robust
network as its network connections are maintained at over 80 % when P is not more
than 10 %. CORONET_L1 has high value of average nodal degree (k) (2.72), and
low values of maximum nodal degree (kmax) (5) and average shortest path length
ðhliÞ (6.6741) which would explain this result. This network is also an assortative
network with r = 0.0357. Nonetheless, the KDL network has the least robustness.
For instance, in the range of 3 to 5 % of P, the connections of KDL are reduced to
\15 %. This is because KDL has the lowest value of hki (2.3846) and the highest
value of hli (22.727), and is also a disassortative network (r = -0.096).
In Fig. 2a it can be seen that the GEANT, RENATER and TISCALI_L3
networks have similar ATTR behavior and these networks remain in the top five of
most robust networks. At 5 % of P their networks connections are reduced to 80 %.
This first set of networks have high values of hki, and low values of hli and diameter
(D). In contrast, the COGENTCO, SPRINT_L1 and USCARRIER networks lose
more than 50 % of their connections after 5 % of P. This second set of networks is
characterized by low values of hki and high values of hli and D.
In Fig. 2b, the robustness results for natural connectivity (k) are presented. As
can be seen, with\20 % of P it is possible to identify which networks are more
robust than others and they can be grouped. Thus, the most robust networks are
TISCALI_L3, DELTACOM and GARR, and the least robust are USCARRIER,
SPRINT_L1 and KDL. Analogous robustness results for k were obtained with the
largest eigenvalue (k1) metric. Hence, structural metrics selected in this analysis
agree in grouping the more and less robust networks. These sets of networks have
similar topological properties, as can be seen in Table 2.
With respect to centrality-based metrics and comparing the structural robustness
results, the networks with high centralization values are the most robust i.e.
networks have more nodes with similar centrality values that can help to maintain
network connections when the percentage of nodes removed increases according to
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targeted attacks. However, in simultaneous targeted attacks, the network central-
ization based on degree centrality (dc) is the most appropriate metric to measure the
network robustness owing to nodes being removed by their degree centrality values.
Similar to structural metrics, centrality-based metrics allow network robustness to
be compared to no more than 20 % of failures.
Figure 3 shows the robustness results of network centralization based on degree
centrality (dc). As can be seen, it is possible to identify three subsets of networks:
the first has two networks with the highest robustness (TISCALI_L3 and CESNET),
the second has four networks with an intermediate robustness (GEANT,
RENATER, GARR and GPENI_L2) and the third has the least robust networks
e.g. SPRINT_L1, ATT_L1, US_MW and KDL. The topological properties of these
subsets of networks are similar i.e. the most robust networks have high values of
hki, and low values of hli and D, whereas the least robust networks have low values
of hki and high values of hli and D (see Table 2).
5.3 Robustness Analysis Under Sequential Targeted Attacks
This section presents the robustness analysis of the real telecommunication
networks when nodes are removed under the sequential targeted attack. In this
scenario the most effective technique for removing nodes is nodal betweenness
centrality (bc) [4]. As can be observed in Fig. 4a, the average two-terminal
reliability (ATTR) results show that all networks are more robust under sequential
targeted attacks than when compared to simultaneous targeted attacks. A similar
robustness behavior for both attacks can be found in [4]. Figure 4a also shows that
when the percentage of removed nodes (P) is between 1 and 5, 50 % of the network
connections are lost. At 15 % of P, most of the networks reduce their connections to
\20 % and, at 20 % or more networks are near to being completely disconnected.
By comparing this robustness result to robustness results in simultaneous targeted






























Fig. 3 Network centralization results for simultaneous targeted attack
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fourth to first place in the rankings of most robust networks, whereas
CORONET_L1 descends to eighth place. TISCALI_L1 has a high average nodal
degree ðhkiÞ value (5.0588) and a low average shortest path length ðhliÞ value
(2.4298) which can explain this result. In contrast to the CORONET_L1 network,
TISCALI_L3 is one the most disassortative network (r = -0.3614). This means
that disassortative networks are less vulnerable to sequential targeted attacks by
nodal betweenness centrality and assortative networks show more robustness under
simultaneous targeted attacks by nodal degree centrality. This result for assortativity
coefficient (r) analysis is the same as was found in [4]. In both targeted attacks, KDL



































































Fig. 4 Structural results for sequential targeted attack. a Average two-terminal reliability (ATTR) results
and b natural connectivity (k) results
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In Fig. 4b the robustness results for natural connectivity (k) metric are presented.
The k metric allows networks to be identified that are the most robust to\25 % of
P. In this sense, TISCALI_L3 presents the best robustness and USCARRIER the
poorest. The largest eigenvalue (k1) metric exhibit similar robustness behavior to k.
In both cases, the robustness degradation is lower than the results found in the
simultaneous targeted attacks.
For centrality-based metrics, the most robust networks are also those which have
high centralization values. In contrast with simultaneous targeted attack results, for
sequential targeted attacks these metrics allow network robustness to be compared
to no more than 35 % of failures. In this failure scenario, network centralization
based on nodal closeness centrality (cc) and nodal betweenness centrality (bc) are
the most effective metrics to measure the network robustness in sequential targeted
attacks due to the nodes being removed by their betweenness centrality values. As
shown in Fig. 5, in the range of 1–10 % of P, the shortest paths are quickly lost,
then, the length of the shortest path between nodes quickly increases. Therefore,
networks have fewer nodes with high values of betweenness or closeness centrality
which generate the increases of network centralization values.
Figure 5 shows the robustness results according to the network centralization
based on bc. As can be observed, in the range of 1–10 % of failures, it is not easy to
identify which networks are most robust due to the high variability produced by the
increase of hli. Nonetheless, when P is between 10 and 30 %, it can be seen that
TISCALI_L3 is most robust network, followed by the group encompassing the
CESNET, RENATER, GEANT and GARR networks and lastly by a set of least
robust networks e.g. SPRINT_L1, USCARRIER and KDL. Similarly to robustness
results presented in sequential targeted attacks, the most robust networks have high
values of hki, and low values of hli and D, whereas the least robust networks have
































Fig. 5 Network centralization results for sequential targeted attack
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5.4 Robustness Analysis Under Random Failures Results
In this section, the real telecommunication networks’ robustness, when nodes are
removed under random failures, is presented. In Fig. 6, the robustness results
according to average two-terminal reliability (ATTR) for random node failures are
presented. As can be seen, all networks are more robust under random failures as
compared to both types of targeted attacks. This is because in random attacks it is
less likely that most central nodes are removed in first percentages of failures.
Figure 6 shows that network connections are over 50 % from 1 to 10 % of
failures, whereas all of them reduce their connections to\50 % in the range of 10–
25 % of P. At 68 % or more failures, all networks have\5 % of connections. In this
case, TISCALI_L3 is the most robust network and KDL is the least robust. The set
of networks with high robustness to random node failures has low values of average
shortest path length ðhliÞ and diameter (D), and they are the most disassortative
networks (r\ 0). Furthermore, it can be observed that networks with high average
nodal degree ðhkiÞ show robustness to random attacks, which is in accordance with
the results found in [30].
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper a robustness analysis of 15 real telecommunication networks under
multiple failure scenarios (random and targeted attacks) was carried out. Through
this analysis the common topological proprieties that can be used to group networks
with similar robustness behavior are identified. Furthermore, a taxonomy of
robustness metrics in telecommunication networks has been extended from previous
work and a classification of multiple failure scenarios has been made.
In accordance with the results presented here, some conclusions can be drawn.






































Fig. 6 Structural results for random failures
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telecommunication networks most robust under targeted attacks have high values of
average nodal degree ðhkiÞ, low values of average shortest path length ðhliÞ and
diameter (D), whereas the subset of networks least robust have the opposite results
for hki, hli and D. Similar to previous studies, for disassortative networks (r\ 0)
simultaneous targeted attacks by nodal degree centrality is the most effective
method of degrading a network. However, in sequential targeted attacks by nodal
betweenness centrality, assortative networks (r[ 0) are more vulnerable. These
results are a consequence of disassortative networks having an excess of links
connecting nodes of dissimilar degrees, which in simultaneous targeted attacks are
removed rapidly according to their degree centrality value.
The second round of conclusions is focused on the robustness comparison using
the centrality-based metrics. The subset of real telecommunication networks with
high values for the network centralization metrics based on nodal degree centrality
(dc), nodal closeness centrality (cc) and nodal betweenness centrality (bc) shows
robustness under targeted attacks as more central nodes must be removed to affect
network performance. Networks with low results in centralization metrics are less
robust. Moreover, robustness analysis according to centrality-based metrics can be
carried out by selecting the appropriate metric to identify the impact of nodal
failures. Hence, in simultaneous targeted attacks by nodal degree centrality, the
centralization metric based on dc should be used to measure the robustness.
However, in case of sequential targeted attacks by nodal betweenness centrality,
network robustness should be measured by the centralization metric based on bc.
As to the results of nodal random failures, the subset of more robust real
telecommunication networks have low values of average shortest path length ðhliÞ
and diameter (D), and these are the most disassortative networks (r\ 0). Also,
similar to previous studies, topologies with high average nodal degree ðhkiÞ show
robustness to random failures as there are more nodes available to maintain
connections. Additionally, in random failures the probability of affecting central
nodes at first values of percentage of removed nodes (P) is low compared to targeted
attacks. Therefore, a lot of nodes would have to be removed to degrade the network
structure to the same affectation levels reached by targeted attacks.
As future work, a more in-depth study focused on the relationship between
robustness metrics under multiple failure scenarios could be made. This would
allow those properties of the networks which must be strengthened to maintain
desirable network robustness to be identified.
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